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Abstract. As representatives of nation‐states in global financial markets, sovereign wealth
funds (SWFs) share a common form and many functions. Arguably their form and functions
owe as much to a shared (global) moment of institutional formation as they owe their form
and functions to the hegemony of Anglo‐American finance over the late 20th and early 21st
centuries. We distinguish between the immediate future for SWFs in the aftermath of the
global financial crisis, and two possible long‐term scenarios; one of which sees SWFs
becoming financial goliaths dominating global markets, while the other sees SWFs morphing
into nation‐state development institutions that intermediate between financial markets and
the long‐term commitments of the nation‐state sponsors. If the former scenario dominates,
global financial integration will accelerate with attendant costs and benefits. If the latter
scenario dominates, SWFs are likely to differentiate and evolve, returning, perhaps, to their
national traditions and their respective places in a world of contested power and influence.
Here, we clarify the assumptions underpinning the conception and formation of sovereign
wealth funds over the past twenty years or so in the face of the ‘new’ realities of global
finance.
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Introduction
The global financial crisis has challenged those who believe in the integrity of financial
markets, those who hold the commonplace presumption in favour of ‘light‐touch’
regulation, and those who believe that markets are valuable mechanisms for managing and
distributing risk. Greenspan’s recanting of his hitherto unquestioned belief in the rationality
of market agents is emblematic of the re‐regulation of banking institutions as well as the
compensation practices of the global financial industry.1 Notwithstanding the scope and
depth of the global financial crisis, and the debate over the causes and consequences of the
crisis, recent years have also seen the continued growth and development of sovereign
wealth funds (SWFs). As these funds indicate, nation‐state sponsors have not lost faith with
financial markets. In fact, some would say the appeal of these financial institutions has risen
over the past few years. For example, Merton (2009) has suggested that the US should
establish a SWF to “hold and manage” assets acquired through the crisis, eschewing
government management in favour of “autonomous investment” so as to realise the value
of those assets as markets recover.
The rationale underpinning Merton’s recommendation is a firmly held belief that there are
governance pitfalls associated with public investment. For Merton, the recent experience of
the US Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) is a salutary lesson in how not to
design and govern investment strategy, noting that approval by the PBGC Board and the
Secretaries of Commerce, Labor, and the Treasury for increased equity exposure came in
February 2008 (nine months short of the notional trough of the crisis; see French et al.
2010). By implication, and by reference to the logic justifying the establishment of SWFs
around the world, there is something special about the form and functions of SWFs that
distinguish this type of institution from its close ‘cousins’ within government, including the
currency reserve funds of central banks. As we have noted elsewhere, one claimed virtue of
SWFs is to be found in their relative isolation from political influence (Monk 2009).
Moreover, the quasi‐government status of these institutions facilitates a level of
sophistication in investment and operations typically not found within government, thanks
to SWFs’ claimed commitment to best‐practice standards of governance and transparency
(including the Santiago Principles).
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Sovereign sponsors often have a specific purpose (or purposes) when establishing a SWF
(Clark and Monk 2011). For example, the Singapore government established the GIC so as
to insure the welfare of its citizens against global economic and financial instability and
regional political instability.

The Norwegians established the NBIM so as to manage

resource wealth and underwrite government pension obligations on behalf of future
generations.

Similarly, Australia established the Future Fund so as to promote inter‐

generational equity while ensuring macroeconomic stability in the face of burgeoning public
and private wealth. For the Gulf states, SWFs were established, in part, to preserve their
resource wealth given past experience of ‘windfalls’ lost to corruption, poor investment, and
arbitrary decision‐making. China has sought to realise value from its US dollar holdings
through the China Investment Corporation, while maintaining a modicum of domestic
economic stability. Sovereign sponsors have sought, through their SWFs, rates of return
above the notional risk‐free rate of return on government‐backed securities or, more
precisely, a real rate of return on financial assets higher than the rate of national economic
growth.
These goals and objectives are to be realised through the medium of global financial
markets and, in particular, the dominant markets of the west: London and New York (Wójcik
2011).

Whereas many nation‐states are wary of emerging markets, western markets

promised the opportunity to realise their ambitions through markets deemed highly
efficient, well‐regulated, and relatively transparent in terms of the rights of minority
shareholders (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998).2 As is widely recognised, the post‐1945 map of
20th century economic crises was biased towards Latin America and Asia; these crises were
managed in ways that sought to discount the flow‐on effects to the core financial markets
(Barro 2006). Recent history suggests, however, a rather different geography of financial
crisis wherein the core markets of developed economies may also drive financial instability:
“financial liberalisation may have made it more likely that financial factors in general, and
booms and busts in credit and asset prices in particular, act as drivers of economic
fluctuations” (Bario 2006, 3408).
Having invested heavily in the integrity of western financial markets, the global financial
crisis could have sapped the confidence of sovereign sponsors such that SWFs may have
turned away from those markets in favour of other kinds of investment institutions and
2|Page
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opportunities. The financial crisis did prompt a number of funds to pull‐back their exposure
to western markets and return assets to their sponsors to stabilise macroeconomic
circumstances (as in Singapore). But some sovereign wealth funds took the opportunity to
raise their stakes in markets otherwise subject to diminished expectations and uncertainty.
Looking forward, then, it is important to gauge the likely impact of the global financial crisis
on sovereign wealth funds’ form and function. Accordingly, we need to look beyond the
crisis to consider the various options open to these institutions in the context of markets
subject to more stringent regulation and low‐growth economic prospects. After all, SWFs
were conceived at a time when western financial markets appeared to define the frontiers
of investment. One of the challenges facing SWFs is whether they will continue to rely on
western markets and adopt western institutional forms or if they will instead create new
pathways for investment of sovereign wealth.
The form and functions of SWFs represent a shared commitment, deliberate or otherwise,
to a certain kind of institution and a particular view of the proper governance of investment
separate from the sovereign. Indeed, it might be reasonably suggested that the SWF
phenomenon is yet another instance of the hegemony of financialisation. As such, SWFs
may be taken to represent the ‘high‐water mark’ of this phenomenon and, if they are to
prosper in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, must evolve on their own account.
After all, the establishment of any SWF is likely accompanied by rhetorical gestures and
political commitments; nation‐states are hardly disinterested principals when they put at
arm's‐length an important lever in global financial markets. As such, the formation of any
SWF represents, inevitably, a political moment in the life of a nation‐state, which means
that these institutions carry with them those interests whether explicitly or implicitly
represented in the governance and organisation of the institution.
This paper rehearses the argument about form and function, recognising that today’s ideal
form of the SWF is based on two sets of rules: those related to who is responsible for
investment decision‐making and those related to the conceptual foundations of investment
practice. Thereafter, the paper suggests that the form of SWFs may not be stable over the
long‐term; the challenge facing SWFs is, in part, about transcending traditional forms of
investment management in favour of a genuine commitment to long‐term investment in the
interest of both the SWF and the sovereign. We suggest, in fact, that transcending the
3|Page
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current paradigm may necessitate the transformation of the ‘form’ of SWFs such that they
become strategic investors rather than portfolio investors, knitting together their sponsors’
geopolitical interests with investment management.

Form and Function
The form of an institution refers to the blueprint or principles underpinning its
establishment.

In theory, institutional form provides a certain identifiable shape or

structure to an organisation such that it can be copied or imitated by others. Ostrom (2000,
149) identifies several important principles of institutional design that help us to better
understand the current form of SWFs. She begins with the most obvious but crucial design
principle: setting the boundaries of an institution such that it is clear "who is in and who is
out of a defined set of relationships". Broadly interpreted, this can be applied to SWFs for
distinguishing their mandates, the roles and responsibilities of governing boards, and the
delegated powers of investment executives. A related design rule refers to the source and
volume of resources available for institutional decision‐making, while another rule refers to
the mechanisms by which members of an institution can modify its formal structure and
organisation. In many respects, SWFs begin with a set of resources from their sponsors and,
over time, effectively generate their own resources for decision‐making from assets under
management and investment performance. Few, if any, SWFs have the authority to vary
their responsibilities and organisational structure. In other words, their intended function is
often as rigidly defined as the fund’s form is designed.
It is commonplace to suggest that form and function are intimately related such that
function follows form and form is conceived in relation to planned functions. So, for
example, recognising that most SWFs were conceived to isolate or ‘ring‐fence’ the
management and investment of national assets from direct political influence, this function
has obvious implications for the formal design of the institution and in particular the
boundaries of SWF institutions relative to their nation‐state sponsors. At the same time,
having established the formal constitution and membership of an institution, its functions
could be thought to follow from its original purpose, assuming that those responsible seek
to match their formal responsibilities with their apparent competencies.

That is,
4|Page
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institutional form can effectively set boundaries on the scope of functions consistent with
the inherited form of an organisation. For Merton and Bodie (2005), functional efficiency is
the hallmark of an effective "institutional environment".
Their manifesto for institutional design has the goal of producing individual and collective
decision‐making consistent with accepted theories of financial market structure and
performance.

So, for example, acknowledging behavioural constraints on effective

individual decision‐making, they argue institutional design can compensate for biases and
anomalies such that collective decision‐making may dampen or even eliminate those biases.
In effect, they assume that collective decision‐making tends to exclude extremes, relying
upon the search for consensus to evaluate the options while applying expert judgement
about causes and consequences in ways that tend to exclude individual prejudice. Whether
this is, in fact, a plausible argument is subject to debate especially in the area of pension
fund and endowment fund investment management (see Clark et al. 2006, 2007 disputing
the claimed ‘wisdom of crowds’). Nonetheless, it is a crucial argument made in favour of
separating the management of sovereign assets from the political process—it is presumed
that expert investment boards are not subject to the same pressures as their political
masters and are, as a consequence, more ‘rational’.3
Merton and Bodie idealise institutional design and the process of collective decision‐making.
Those knowledgeable about the process of designing and establishing financial institutions
reject idealism in favour of a more realistic conception of the bargains struck and the
compromises made to produce an agreement to establish a certain type of institution for an
agreed set of purposes (Roe 2006). Considering the establishment of sovereign wealth
funds, we have shown that the political process remains connected with the institution even
if that institution was conceived to be relatively autonomous. In some cases, moreover,
these institutions are thoroughly integrated with the political process or, at least, with the
machinery of government (as in Norway and China). Whereas Merton and Bodie suggest
that institutions can, if properly designed, mediate or eliminate decision biases, the design
process itself is likely implicated in the relationships and commitments that were the basis
of establishing the institution. As such, the design process tends to produce imperfect
institutions that, in some cases, may actually amplify decision‐making biases and anomalies
and reinforce the compromises that the institution was intended to avoid.
5|Page
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In this context, the approach taken by Clark and Urwin (2008a, 2010) has been to accept as
‘given’ institutional form (the inherited constitution and structure of the organisation) and
to focus upon their governance in the hope that ‘effective’ governance can compensate for
both imperfections in the design process and apparent biases and anomalies in individual
and collective decision‐making. Here, we assume that effective financial institutions have
well‐defined purposes, even if there may be conflict or at least tensions between stated
purposes. We also contend that ‘reform’ is always difficult given an institution’s heritage
and that a ‘governance’ approach focused upon the coherence of decision‐making may be
able to improve the functional performance of financial institutions and thereby better
realise their goals. Most importantly, we accept that institutional form tends to be rather
static compared to the pace of innovation in financial markets (Merton 1995); governance
can compensate for the fixed form of institutions by adapting to the imperatives driving
financial markets (see Lo 2004). Elsewhere, we suggest that the decision‐making process be
hierarchically‐ordered so as to allocate responsibility for decision‐making between different
tiers of financial organisations according to their time‐sensitive and resource‐intensive
characteristics (Clark and Urwin 2008b).
This approach has certain advantages, notably its instrumentalist conception of agency over
inherited structure and its recipe for effective policies and procedures (standards of best‐
practice). It does depend on a couple of unstated assumptions, however. Most obviously,
our governance perspective assumes that institutional form is neither determinate of
behaviour nor an outright impediment to incremental adaptation.

This two‐part

assumption cuts against standard treatments of bureaucracies which assume that
bureaucracies are static and antithetical to reason (see Wilson 1989). Further, it suggests a
degree of separation from political sponsors that may not be plausible in some cases (as in
the China Investment Corporation). Institutional form could limit incremental adaptation
and governance could be captured by vested interests. Even so, our governance perspective
assumes that functional effectiveness is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for any
institution’s claim of legitimacy; as such best‐practice governance can be seen, in some
cases, as a gesture designed to claim institutional legitimacy.
There is, however, a larger unstated assumption shared by Merton and Bodie, Clark and
Urwin, and political elites that believe in the mission of SWFs: that is, financial institutions
6|Page
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offer a viable means of realising a premium on sovereign states’ financial assets.4 More
generally, there is a common belief that financial markets are an efficient mechanism for
pricing and distributing risks and that failures in these markets can be reasonably explained
by reference to market maturity, idiosyncratic factors having to do with the failures of
particular institutions (like Long Term Capital Management), and poor governance and
regulation.

Otherwise, financial markets are an efficient mechanism for allocating

resources, representing an institutional innovation consistent with long‐term development
(King and Levine 1993). Recognising the advantages of financial markets for investing
sponsor’s assets, the adoption of a SWF model based on accepted institutional designs and
combined with a commitment to best‐practice governance is likely to realise a premium on
a country’s resources.

SWFs as Market Makers
SWFs will be a force to be reckoned with as financial markets recover from the global
financial crisis. Renewed commitments made by many sovereign entities to their SWFs as
well as the recently established SWFs suggest that the institution has not been as
compromised by the turmoil in global markets as other types of funds. If anything, it seems
that their significance has been strengthened by the increasing reliance of the financial
services industry on their growing assets and their commitment to portfolio investment. In
their latest survey of the global investment industry, Towers Watson (2010) charted the
relative growth in assets held by SWFs as the volume of assets held by conventional pension
funds and insurance companies have declined in absolute and relative terms.

Most

importantly, the growing volume of assets is held by a small number of institutions when
compared to the number of similarly‐sized pension and insurance funds and the average
size of a top‐1000 listed pension fund (see Table 2 in Towers Watson 2010).
Not surprisingly, there is a close relationship between these institutions and the global
investment industry. The average size and commitment of SWF assets is crucial to this
relationship.

But there is more to the relationship than size: because SWFs are not

constrained by burgeoning liabilities, as is the case with many defined benefit pension plans;
because they are not managed in relation to participants’ account balances, as is the case
7|Page
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with defined contribution pension funds; and because they are not subject to increasing
solvency requirements, as is the case with insurance companies and banks, SWFs can be
thought to have greater discretion over tactical and strategic asset allocation (Campbell and
Viceira 2002). This can be thought to affect the nature of the risks SWFs are willing to bare,
the time horizon of investment, the benchmarks (if any) used to evaluate performance, the
demand for innovation in investment management, as well as the nature of ‘products’
offered to SWF clients. If otherwise risk‐averse in relation to the possible political costs
(borne directly or indirectly) of high‐profile failures of investment strategy, SWFs have the
power and position to drive the frontiers of global investment management.
As suggested above, our assessment of the prospects for SWFs in the global economy is
based upon the supposition that the ‘form’ of SWFs is an essential element of the story.
That is, as SWFs mimic and match the institutional logic and organisation of related
institutional investors, they also rely upon what Mackenzie (2006) and others have referred
to as the shared norms and intellectual foundations of investment practice. The standard
example illustrating this argument is, of course, the Black‐Scholes option pricing model
which is used throughout the western financial sector to set market prices of future
positions. For many institutions, it is the reference point, as well, for exchange and trading
under risk and uncertainty. So widely accepted is this model that it has morphed from being
an ‘instrument’ to being a ‘constitutive’ element of institutional decision‐making and market
behaviour. It is no less important for the inherited form of investment management than
the bricks and mortar of financial markets like London and New York, and the electronic
architecture of internal and external networks (see also Merton and Bodie 2005).
More generally, we contend that the SWF form is an intellectual edifice perched on three
pillars. The first is modern portfolio theory (MPT). Owed to Harry Markowitz (1952), MPT
provides a recipe for investors in constructing their investment portfolios, distinguishing
between the risks associated with any one investment and the risks associated with the
entire portfolio. At the limit, the total portfolio of an institutional investor could be the
12,000 or so traded securities available on global financial markets. More often, portfolios
are constructed by jurisdiction and market capitalisation where, for example, the FT100, the
S&P500, and the DAX30 represent the major stocks traded, respectively, on the London,
New York and Frankfurt stock markets.
8|Page
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The second pillar is the so‐called efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) which represents the
fact that markets are information‐processing machines (Wilhelm and Downing 2001), and
that market prices reflect the available information about individual stocks (Fama 1970). In
combination, MPT and the EMH are the foundations for what Merton and Bodie (2005, 4)
termed as the “neoclassical model” or “approach” to investment management.5 If widely
disputed and deeply implicated in both the LTCM and the global financial crisis (Lowenstein
2000, 2010), these two pillars are the norms underpinning the management of investment
risk and the integrity of market prices.

For institutional investors like SWFs, these

propositions frame the nature of institutional decision‐making, how they manage the
investment process, and their reliance upon the market pricing of assets.
The third pillar reinforces the two previous pillars: asset allocation is deemed the crucial
strategic decision when setting funds’ investment programmes.

This is justified by

reference to MPT in that the diversification of assets amongst more or less correlated asset
classes is believed to be an efficient way of managing total portfolio risk. It is also justified
by reference to the long‐run returns on different asset classes, often‐times looking back
over 50 to 100 years comparing equities against bonds (for example). In this respect,
Dimson et al. (2002) provided the seminal academic treatment of the issue setting out the
case for the existence of a long‐term equity premium.6 Notice, strategic asset allocation is
also deemed consistent with the investment goals of many SWFs; it is a recipe for long‐term
investment.
So, the form of SWFs is a mixture of the rules governing institutional decision‐making and
the rules governing the investment process.

As such, there is a close, reinforcing

relationship between these two sets of rules in that the rules governing decision‐making are
legitimated by the expertise and knowledge believed to underpin the rules governing
investment. Consequently, it should not be surprising that many SWFs have seen the global
financial crisis as an ‘opportunity’ to realise their long‐term investment objectives. The
alternative, which would be to abandon global financial markets and discount the value of
the three pillars of “neoclassical finance”, would be an attack on the very rules justifying
their existence and the relative autonomy this type of institution enjoys from their political
sponsors. Importantly, the rules governing decision‐making combined with the rules of
investment are also a means of justifying a long‐term perspective against short‐term market
9|Page
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volatility and a means of justifying an investment strategy in favour of equities (for example)
at a time when markets are beset by pessimism.

More generally, our conception of the rule‐based form of SWFs goes some way to
undercutting the commonplace assumption of a categorical distinction between this type of
institution and global financial markets. We have suggested that SWFs are constituted, in
part, in relation to the structure and performance of global financial markets as if SWFs do
not have a role in constituting the structure and performance of markets. And yet, given
their increasing size and the scope of their investments, financial markets have come to rely
(in part) upon the flow‐of‐assets from SWFs into both the developed markets of the west
and, increasingly, the emerging markets of the east and the south. This fact‐of‐life was
noted in a comment made by Gillian Tett in the Financial Times (July 15th 2010, p. 6) to the
effect that Asian SWFs were very influential in the decision made by European governments
to go‐ahead with the ‘stress‐testing’ of their banks despite uncertainty over the prospects of
the Euro. Tett cites the purchase by China’s SAFE (a quasi‐SWF) of Spanish bonds as
evidence for the ‘market‐making’ capacity of these government actors in situations where
market players from developed countries are unable or unwilling to take risks.

From this discussion, we draw three obvious implications for the future of SWFs. First, to
the extent that SWFs are ‘constituted’ by the rules governing investment, their longer‐term
prospects depend upon those rules realising expected rates of return on SWF assets.
Second, to the extent that SWFs ‘constitute’ global financial markets, SWFs have an interest
in ensuring that the rules‐of‐the‐game underpinning market structure and performance are
consistent with the rules of investment that legitimate their institutional form. Third, given
their reliance upon financial markets, SWFs also have an interest in promoting the
development of emerging markets in ways consistent with the presumed ‘optimal’
institutional structure of developed markets. In combination, SWFs together and separately
have an interest in realising the promise of neoclassical finance even if this means
promoting the institutional design and governance of global financial markets in ways that
sovereign governments may find inconsistent with their interests.7

10 | P a g e
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As such, SWFs are faced with a dilemma: in the aftermath of the global financial crisis they
may benefit from exploiting the apparent gaps in and between markets, the risk‐aversion of
established market players, the obvious reliance of sovereign nations on SWFs as market‐
makers for offered government bonds and the increasing reliance of certain companies on
SWFs to act as “investors of last resort”. But the position of power in global financial
markets carries risks as well as rewards—there is a danger that public recognition of SWF
market‐making may prompt the same kind of reaction as when Middle‐Eastern SWFs sought
to buy so‐called US strategic infrastructure assets. More to the point, for a large SWF to
apply leverage to the global market for sovereign bonds may bring it into conflict with its
political masters as well as its intended targets. Equally, sovereign sponsors may seek to
integrate SWF investment strategy into their geopolitical ambitions. Either way, the rules of
institutional form would be violated; the autonomy claimed by SWFs by reason of their
expertise and knowledge of markets would give way to the absorption of SWFs into
government treasuries.

New Realities of Global Finance
Anecdotal evidence suggests that in the depth of the global financial crisis, some of the
worlds’ largest SWFs effectively underwrote the liquidity of global equity and bond markets.
And, today, it is arguable that SWFs remain a vital element in the core markets of advanced
economies and, in particular, the US dollar and the Euro. With a strong market position
comes market anxieties. It is not surprising that some of the largest funds have sought to
influence the debate over the global regulatory response to the financial crisis and national
regulatory reforms. Being dependent upon major markets for returns on assets invested,
some of the largest SWFs have emerged as “universal owners” in the lexicon coined by
Hawley and Williams (2007).
This discussion has brought into the open a dilemma that goes to the heart of SWF form. To
the extent that SWFs are constituted in terms of the imperatives driving global financial
markets and, in turn, constitute the functional performance of those markets, the
responsibility for reform remains in the hands of sovereign nation‐states whose interests
are, in no small measure, driven by domestic and geopolitical interests (Rajan 2010).
11 | P a g e
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Furthermore, those countries whose markets are at the very core of the global market
system do not sponsor SWFs and, through the crisis, more often than not opted for short‐
term solutions to long‐term problems. Western governments have recognised that many of
the largest SWFs have few options other than investment in core markets. Implicit in
nation‐state policies that have sought to underwrite short‐term macroeconomic conditions
is the assumption that SWFs and other private investors like pension funds and
endowments are hostages‐to‐fortune—they cannot retreat from markets and thereby
realise losses on their portfolios, nor can they find refuge in ready‐made alternatives
(whether emerging markets, private placements etc).8
Their long‐term investment programmes are, in effect, a form of insurance for the short‐
term prospects of whole nations. It is little wonder that the Chinese government has been
resistant to calls to discount the value of the Renminbi. In carrying US government bonds,
the government through the CIC and SAFE have underwritten the assumption of debt by the
US government to reflate the domestic economy. For the Chinese government to initiate
the revaluation of the Renminbi against the US dollar would simultaneously discount the
value of their US government bond holdings while discounting the competitiveness of
Chinese producers relative to western markets. The primary beneficiary of such a policy
would be the US government. While such reasoning may well be judged to be an expression
of self‐defeating neo‐mercantilism, at odds with 20th century notions of global economic
and financial integration, it reflects the dilemma facing large holders of financial assets
(made more acute, no doubt, by the geopolitical interests of SWF sponsors).
Through the crisis and now the putative economic ‘recovery’, the rationale behind western
governments’ expansionary macroeconomic policies is readily apparent: indebtedness is
preferable to precipitating another great depression. If subject to political debate and
dispute in the west, it has been accepted by countries such as the PR of China recognising
their medium‐term dependence upon western consumers for economic prosperity.
Accompanying this argument has been another, more controversial, argument to the effect
that the financial crisis was an ‘event’ whose genesis in US subprime housing mortgages
provides a rationale for confidence in the long‐term prospects of developed economies’
financial markets. By this logic, failures of US regulation and market oversight combined
with the self‐seeking behaviour of financial ‘producers’ and ‘consumers’ alike combined to
12 | P a g e
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amplify the ever‐present but normally benign behavioural biases and anomalies evident in
financial markets (Lee et al. 2009). As such, to the extent that the regulatory response is
effective in limiting the possibilities of such an event reoccurring in the future, the integrity
of financial markets will be protected and the loyalty of investors to financial markets
enhanced.
For those convinced that the financial crisis was less of an ‘event’ than an instance of the
disequilibrium effects of global imbalances, recovery from the crisis is a structural problem
not simply a short‐term macroeconomic ‘fix’ (Stiglitz 2010). That is, economic and financial
stability is to be found by redressing the savings deficit in the US and the savings surplus of
China and the exporting countries of the rest‐of‐the‐world (including Germany and Japan).
At issue then is the need to reduce leverage: on one side, the leverage of western
governments on capital inflows, the leverage of western consumers on future earnings, and
the leverage of western banking and investment houses on financial market expectations.
On the other side, the reliance of governments on export earnings, the reliance of the
emerging middle classes of east Asian countries on economic growth, and the reliance of
surplus ‘saving’ countries on the developed financial markets of the west for superior rates
of return. In this respect, SWFs are more than storehouses of financial assets; they are also
representative of unsustainable trade imbalances and expectations as regards the risk‐
adjusted rate of return to be found in the highly leveraged markets of the west.
Implied, then, is a larger argument to the effect that financial instability is not simply event‐
driven but is symptomatic of eastern neo‐mercantilism and western financialisation. In fact,
it is arguable that western financialisation has encouraged asset‐driven eastern neo‐
mercantilism. Consider the thesis advanced by Borio (2006) and his colleagues at the IMF.
In essence, their thesis is about the interaction between macroeconomic regulation and the
booms and busts in asset prices. The first half of their argument notes that western
countries have been “extremely successful in conquering inflation”. Not only has this
success stabilised growth in output, it has also encouraged a shift in expectations from
cyclical to structural change.

More to the point, macroeconomic policy success has

underwritten the real value of financial assets.

Reinforcing this effect, financial

liberalisation has given licence to an enormous burst in financial product innovation and the
shift in household and business balance‐sheets towards financial assets over ‘real’ assets.
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Success in the west on these counts, however, has not always been matched by success in
emerging markets which are characterised by far greater economic and financial instability
and policy and regulation immaturity.
For Borio and his colleagues, financial liberalisation has “greatly facilitated the access to
credit” for households and business, reinforcing expectations of wealth supported by
leverage in so‐called real assets. He notes, moreover, that the risk‐appetite of the private
sector rises as economic growth accelerates, reinforcing “cross‐sectional” expectations in
financial markets and drawing into markets even more financial assets in the search for the
premium on market expectations. As such the equity premium is much less important than
the premium on expectations. Asset bubbles are dashed by ‘events’ that in some way or
another expose the fact that these bubbles are unsustainable.

Basically, Borio has

developed a theory of endogenous booms and busts centred on the developed financial
markets of the world. By contrast, much of the history written about financial market
booms and busts over the 20th century shows that bubbles were transmitted from the
periphery of the global economy to the core markets of the western world (Barro 2006). As
such, financial crises in the west are less about economic under‐development and more
about the financial and institutional evolution of western economies (see Clark 2000).
In many respects, Borio and his colleagues have challenged the status quo of
macroeconomic regulation hitherto dominant in western countries. Whereas it was an
article of faith that macroeconomic policy was properly focused on ‘real’ indicators like
employment, inflation and economic growth, Borio suggests that managing the interaction
between the real and financial sectors of western economies is an essential role for central
banks. Whereas it was assumed that macroeconomic stability was a condition for economic
growth and the realisation of investment objectives, financial markets have emerged to rival
economic growth as the source of asset appreciation and wealth. In this context, the
regulatory response to the financial crisis may have far‐reaching implications: if conceived in
terms of the ‘event’ rather than the systemic relationship between the real economy and
financial markets in western economies, it seems likely that there will be other booms and
busts, financial crises, and market volatility. It is arguable that the patchwork‐quilt of
national responses to the crisis, focusing on elements of the crisis rather than its underlying
causes, will do little to dampen the systemic causes of the crisis (French et al. 2010).
14 | P a g e
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By this logic, the promise of superior returns through well‐regulated and stable western
markets may not be realised over the long‐term for SWFs.

Just as importantly, the

intellectual foundations of Merton and Bodie’s (2005) “neoclassical finance” may not be an
adequate recipe for investment management or a justifiable rationale for the current form
of many SWFs. If ‘trapped’ by past commitments, necessitating the deepening of market
relationships and investment management, SWFs may have to re‐make themselves to cope
with the ‘new’ realities of global financial markets.9

SWFs as Strategic Investors
Looking forward, it is useful to remind the reader about the obvious functions of SWFs—the
apparent shared goals and objectives of these institutions when first established by their
respective sovereign sponsors.

In our case studies, we have identified five common

functions more or less shared between the SWFs according to their host countries’
particular circumstances, political traditions, and places in the world. These functions can
be listed in the following order (a logical order though not necessarily the order relevant to
specific countries).
•

SWFs are a means of realising a long‐term premium on a nation’s wealth over and
above the projected real rate of national economic growth. This premium is realised
through financial assets invested in a broad portfolio of assets, representing the
potential of global economic integration rather than the potential of one country or
region.

•

SWFs are a means of separating a portion of a nation’s accumulating wealth from
the real economy by placing those assets ‘outside’ of the economy so as to promote
long‐term macroeconomic stability.10

•

SWFs are a means of insuring the future economic prosperity of a sovereign entity in
the context of global economic and financial instability and the limits of nation‐state
power in the international community of nations.

•

SWFs are a means of storing a nation’s wealth separate from the short‐term
exigencies and political commitments that characterise the life of a sovereign nation;
in this sense, SWFs are an endowment fund for the conservation of wealth.
15 | P a g e
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•

SWFs are a means of distributing current national wealth, often due to the
exploitation of finite resources, to future generations either through discounting the
value of accumulated liabilities or by maximising the future value of current assets.

These five functions do not, of course, exhaust the list of possible SWF functions. For
example, some SWFs underwrite the current welfare of citizens over‐and‐above that which
is possible through the local economy.

Other SWFs underwrite certain government

commitments, especially in circumstances where cycles in government revenue and
expenditure are so severe that realising spending commitments can only be found in
insulating government from the local economy. Do these functions necessarily imply a
certain institutional form? Can these five common functions be realised through another
institutional form or forms? For that matter, do these functions require SWFs that invest in
global financial markets? Consider the options.
Each of these five functions makes a distinction between the short‐term and the long‐term,
local commitments as opposed to global commitments, and the investment returns to be
found in the global economy as opposed to the sovereign sponsor’s economy. Does this
mean that SWFs should be or are by necessity portfolio investors in the manner suggested
by Merton and Bodie’s (2005) “neoclassical finance”? Surely, there are alternatives. For
example, instead of ‘owning’ a global portfolio of traded securities conceived in terms of the
‘efficient frontiers’ of modern portfolio theory, SWFs can take large stakes in relatively few
companies either on the equity (ownership) side or on the debt (creditor) side. Having a
controlling interest in a relatively small number of global corporations would allow the SWF
to realise the sovereign’s needs, while allowing it to take long‐term positions without being
captive to the ever‐present threat of turmoil in global financial markets (see the Qatar
Investment Authority as an example of a SWF that has moved in this direction).
Here, we can discern a ‘gap’ between the touted goals and objectives of SWFs and their
market behaviour. While committed, as noted above, to realising long‐term rates of return
at a premium on sovereign sponsors’ expected rate of national economic growth, being in
the market means, more often than not, acting as portfolio investors in relation to short‐
term market movements. Moreover, ambiguity over the desired premium on national
economic growth in many countries often translates into an objective function that matches
16 | P a g e
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the objective function of many other institutional investors: maximisation of the risk‐
adjusted rate of return against accepted market benchmarks. This is, of course, consistent
with the ideal ‘form’ of institutional investment that dominates western markets. It is also
consistent with the expectations and expertise of the global financial services industry. But,
as a practice, it may be judged to be inconsistent with the putative functions of many if not
most SWFs.
Long‐term investment is more than a beta strategy—that is, a market‐following strategy
based upon the changing composition of traded securities. It is also a strategy that seeks
refuge from ‘events’, is cognisant of cycles in the real economy, and is aware of the
underlying structural trajectory of industries, regions, and the global economy. Put slightly
differently, a long‐term investment strategy seeks to realise the benefits of technological
innovation and the fundamental drivers of economic competitiveness rather than patching
together the long‐term out of successive (and often volatile) short‐term positions.

If

conceived in this manner, the related commitments of sovereign sponsors to issues such as
‘ethical investing’ as well as global concerns such as climate change can be seen as
reflections of long‐term value.

So, for example, climate change can be a long‐term

investment opportunity instead of an ineffective short‐term screen on the global portfolio
of an investment manager (service provider). At issue is the technological frontier rather
than the immediate environmental costs of resources.
This topic has garnered considerable attention in the aftermath of the global financial crisis
(Stern 2009). Its popularity is, in part, a function of what it seeks to avoid: dependence
upon an industry and its markets that many believe are subject to incentives and recurrent
events that discount value. At this point, it is not important to set‐out in detail the logic and
character of long‐term investment. Rather, our point here is to simply suggest that if SWFs
are to be long‐term investors in a manner consistent with the five functions listed above, it
may be the case that the current form of many SWFs is antithetical to realising in a
systematic fashion those functions. If so, the future form of SWFs will look less like that
which has been inherited from modern financial theory and practice and more like
merchant banks whose relationships with their ‘clients’ are framed by reciprocal
commitment rather than anonymity. Put slightly differently, the future form of SWFs may
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have the depth of expertise and knowledge consistent with their commitments rather than
their relationships with the financial services industry.
There are three obvious objections to this model of the future. One is simply that the depth
of expertise and knowledge needed to be effective strategic investors is in short supply and,
in any event, would not be attracted to SWFs because of their complex structures of
decision‐making. Both aspects of this argument are credible although we should note that
through the crisis SWFs have strengthened their human resources considerably (Clark and
Monk 2009). But it is also apparent that the type of expertise and knowledge consistent
with long‐term investing is different in type than the expertise and knowledge currently
demanded by global portfolio investors. Equally, it is arguable that the autonomy sought by
market traders, typical of some of the largest global banks over the past decade or so, is
both inconsistent with risk‐management and inconsistent with the significance of individual
investments taken in an institution committed to selected long‐term stakes.
Another objection is that once an institution moves away from the norms and protocols of
“neoclassical finance”, it becomes much harder to govern the investment process against
third‐party standards of performance. This may be true; it is a challenge that faces a
number of larger institutions in moving from benchmark measures of performance to
absolute measures of performance based upon a priori target rates of long‐term return.
Assessment of performance in this model of institutional investment becomes a data‐
intensive and time‐intensive process governed by investment beliefs and tests of
competence rather than the virtual and often‐times automatic peer‐group measures of
performance that currently dominate the investment management industry.
A third objection would be that once a SWF makes a commitment to long‐term investment
based upon a small portfolio of projects, the way is opened for the SWF to become non‐
commercial (i.e. ‘strategic’ instead of ‘portfolio’). Here lie, then, the anxieties of many in the
west that believe SWFs are an extension of sovereign interests, legitimated today only by
their apparent acceptance of the ‘form’ of the modern institutional investor (see Santiago
Principles). But if the price of legitimacy is reliance upon western financial markets and
providers, the price (returns discounted by volatility) may be too high when set against the
desired functions of SWFs (including inter‐generational equity). Some of the world’s largest
18 | P a g e
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pension funds, especially those from Canada and Australia, have become strategic investors
with significant stakes in selected firms and industries. In a similar manner, but perhaps
more hidden behind the veil of ignorance, Chinese development banks, the CIC and related
institutions have taken significant stakes in African resource companies and countries (Clark
and Monk 2011). At base, the objection is geopolitical and reflects the strains on the global
hegemon as it comes to terms with the changing balance of power in the global economy.
In short, if a form of SWFs was to be adopted that met its functions, we would expect to see
a slow but profound shift in the geographical locus of investment. Instead of relying upon
western financial markets, the premium would be on those firms, industries and regions
that fit with national development strategies, such as those at the centre of the ‘emerging’
global economy of the 21st century (Scott 1998). Of course, these opportunities may be
found in the west. But, given the trajectory of western economic growth, population, and
development their ‘home’ jurisdictions would be less important than their integration with
the east and, to a lesser extent, the south. In these ways, the withdrawal of SWFs from
western markets is likely to discount the significance of these market institutions as the
“hubs” to global capital “spokes”. As such, the short‐term response of SWFs to the crisis will
prove to be a false dawn.

Conclusions
Sovereign wealth funds can be seen as a reflection of global economic integration—being
the stores of assets derived from trade and exchange. For some countries, resource
endowments have provided ‘windfall’ revenue flows to nation‐state coffers. For other
countries, the export of produced goods and services has created public and private wealth,
some of which has been diverted from consumption to capital appreciation. For yet other
countries with high levels of domestic saving and a geopolitical location at the interstices of
global trade, SWFs have been created to smooth the ups and downs of the global economy.
For some countries, their SWFs are at the very heart of their long‐term plans for economic
development; the assets held and invested by their SWFs are a means of reconciling current
generations’ commitment to sovereign autonomy and the welfare of future generations.
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For other countries, however, their SWFs might as well be savings banks rather than
strategic instruments bound up with the aspirations of their political masters.
As we suggested, SWFs can be characterised and distinguished according to their shared
functions. For example, the Australian Future Fund shares with a number of other SWFs the
function of holding financial assets that would otherwise over‐whelm macroeconomic
stability. We think of this function as a ‘default’ function in that it reflects the limits of
nation‐state policy making and economic conditions. Significantly, though, the Australian
Future Fund was conceived to enhance the interests of future generations by paying‐off the
accumulated liabilities associated with current generations of federal government
employees. As we demonstrated, future generations have a financial stake in the future;
they also have a broader interest in the sustainability of the ‘Australian way of life’. As such,
it is not surprising that a number of SWFs that have a future‐seeking mandate have come to
read that mandate in broader ways than perhaps financial professionals find congenial. In
this respect, the legitimacy of a SWF may well be based upon national values and
commitments (as in the Norwegian NBIM).
These functions are matched with a shared institutional form: it is the relationship between
form and function that defines what is and what is not a SWF. In its simplest conception,
SWFs share many of the attributes of large pension funds, endowments, and insurance
companies: being institutional investors, these entities combine asset management with the
discipline imposed by accepted theories of portfolio investment—especially those related to
what Merton and Bodie (2005) termed as “neoclassical finance”.

We sketched the

principles and practices consistent with the accepted form of SWFs to emphasise the
distinctiveness of SWFs (compared to other nation‐state asset management) and their
reliance upon the structure and performance of global financial markets. In many cases, an
important shared function of SWFs is their search for a premium on assets invested over‐
and‐above that which is available in their home jurisdictions due to capacity constraints,
economic growth and development. That there is, or should be, such a premium is one of
the beliefs that justified the formation of SWFs in the first place.11
Textbooks abound on related topics such as the equity premium, the historical significance
of asset allocation for portfolio investors, and tactical and strategic investment (Goetzmann
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and Ibbotson 2006). These topics are representative of the global financial services industry
and the academic establishment that sustains it; these topics also represent the type of
conceptual discipline often imposed on SWF investment by managers and consultants alike.
In this manner, the form of SWFs is constituted by the enabling legislation or administrative
orders that established these institutions and by the intellectual foundations of investment
management that provide protocols for behaviour and decision‐making. As constituted,
SWFs rely upon global financial markets for the opportunities to place investments and
realise their goals and objectives.

Indeed, the intellectual foundations of investment

management match in form and substance related expectations as regards the structure
and performance of developed financial markets. Hence, the form and functions of SWFs
are intimately related to finance‐led capitalism.
It should not be surprising that in the aftermath of the global financial crisis it would appear
that SWFs may well strengthen their relationships with the global financial services industry.
At one level, these relationships are vital if SWFs are to take advantage of the market
turmoil occasioned by the crisis. At another level, though, given the form and functions of
SWFs, it would seem inevitable that their response would be to realise their commitments
in the form of a deepening relationship to markets and service providers.
We have also sought to suggest that the future of SWFs is more open, and more in flux than
this logic would suggest. One lesson of the crisis has been that SWFs, despite their status of
investors without liabilities, can be extremely vulnerable to market ups and downs. In fact,
when considered over the past 15 years or so, it is arguable that financial markets have
hardly returned anything more than the global real rate of economic growth (taking account
of volatility, inflation, and the costs of investment management). In this context, it is not
obvious that a traditional financial institution, which is how we would label the current form
of SWFs, remains the only form consistent with sovereign interests.
Accordingly, we foresee an eventuality whereby SWFs, cognizant of the fact that western
markets no longer offer a reliable investment risk premium, will evolve into different
institutions in the coming decades. In effect, we envision SWFs transforming themselves
into long‐term investors whose holdings are selected on the basis of their strategic interests
(of the fund and the nation) rather than the principles underpinning modern portfolio
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theory. If so, the future of SWFs will be more like that feared by their critics in the west
than the ideal form argued to be consistent with a symbiotic relationship with the west. The
costs of this transformation will be felt by global financial markets as liquidity ebbs away
and SWFs make their own ways in the world of economic development rather than market
arbitrage and speculation.

Endnotes

1

/. Reported in The Wall Street Journal (July 2009) by Kara Scannell and Sudeep Reedy “Greenspan admits

errors to hostile House panel” available at the http://online.wsj.com website (accessed October 7th 2009).
2

/. The claimed virtues of western financial markets, and especially Anglo‐American markets, were widely
cited as reasons for the apparent success of the USA in technological innovation, economic growth, and the
attraction of talent (on a global scale) through the 1980s and 1990s, and up to the financial crisis. Continental
European nations were deemed far less competitive as a consequence, driving ‘reform’ in financial systems
and investment practice that can be thought partly responsible for the vulnerability of German regional
banking systems to the US sub‐prime crisis. See Clark and Wojcik (2007) on this debate.
3

/. Whereas much of the relevant literature is pre‐occupied by the issue of rationality, we argue that it is a
matter of competence rather than rationality or irrationality. Financial markets are remarkable environments;
being subject to risk and uncertainty, effective decision‐making requires a level of expertise and judgement
well‐beyond that found in everyday life (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).

4

/. Embedded in many accounts of the theory and practice of investment management is the belief that
“neoclassical theory is approximately valid for determining asset prices and resource allocations” (Merton and
Bodie 2005, 6).
5

/. The efficient markets hypothesis has been subject to a great deal of debate, especially in relation to the
global financial crisis (Ragan 2010, 146). For some, the global financial crisis is evidence that the EMH was at
best misleading and at worst the motivating logic of corporate and governmental hubris. At this point, we
should note that the EMH does not necessarily promise socially‐desirable outcomes. Moreover, to the extent
that market pricing is information‐sensitive, the quality, quantity, and price of the available information are
obviously crucial variables affecting the decisions of market agents (who may be also subject to behavioural
biases and anomalies; see Hilton 2003).
6

/. For the latest instalment, see Dimson et al. (2010) on the recovery of markets since the global financial
crisis. They emphasise the relationship between developed and emerging financial markets, and the
relationship between economic growth and market performance (arguing that the former drives the latter).
They also emphasise continuity with the past and the ever‐present tendency of markets (within and between)
to mean‐reversion.
7

/. The failure to produce a coherent global regulatory response to the financial crisis will have a number of
pernicious consequences, one of which may be the re‐emergence of inter‐jurisdictional arbitrage. Banking
institutions may, in effect, side with their SWF consumers rather than their ‘host’ nations, using differences
between countries’ banking and financial regulation to claim advantage either through the threat of re‐
location in favour of their clients or by leveraging the reliance of their host nations on the flow‐of‐funds
generated by SWF investment for special consideration.
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8

/. A thread in public commentary on the causes and consequences of the global financial crisis emphasises the
close relationships between US political and financial elites, arguing that they were able to exploit the reliance
of foreign investors on western (and especially US markets) to the benefit of US banks and financial service
companies (and indirectly, political elites). The prices charged other investors, and the perception that US
banks trading on their own account were able to benefit at the expense of ‘external’ investors, has encouraged
SWFs to look more closely at the ‘value‐for‐money’ proposition underpinning continuing commitment to
western markets and service providers. See generally Simon Johnson “The quiet coup” in The Atlantic
Monthly, May 2009 available at www.theatlantic.com (accessed August 5th 2010).
9

/. In a related vein, Clarida (2010) and El‐Erian (2010) disparage the idea that markets will return to ‘normal’; a
world characterised by relatively low market volatility and low‐impact events that do little to disturb
confidence in market pricing. Their world of the ‘new’ normal is anything but normal: historical low rates of
economic growth, periodic bursts of price inflation, and sovereign defaults where “the distribution of
outcomes is flatter and the tails are fatter” (Clarida 2010, 2). At one level, their argument is informed by
investment practice. At another level, it is informed by a realist conception of the unthinkable.
10

/. See Bernanke’s August 2nd 2010 comments to a group of southern (US) state governors suggesting that, in
the future, they may wish to build‐up sizable reserve funds so as to deal with the prospect of greater economic
volatility. This has been characterised by some as a ‘save for a rainy day’ strategy and is found in the motives
of some nation‐states when establishing sovereign wealth funds. This point was put as advice ‘on camera’ by
the previous President of Chile to the then Prime Minister of Great Britain Gordon Brown. See Rajan (2010,
201‐202) for related advice. Presumably any such strategy would require an institution like a SWF insulated
from political pressures. See www.marketwatch.com (accessed 3rd August 2010).
11

/. In the literature this premium is typically identified as the equity risk premium (see Dimson et al. 2002).
Recent research on the nature and value of such a premium has cast doubt on its size (Fama and French 2002),
how best to estimate it (Campbell 2008), and its characteristics by jurisdiction (Gregory 2007). In their
assessment of investment strategy for the Norwegian SWF, Ang et al. (2009) suggest that it may be better to
refer to the risk premium on investment than an equity risk premium.
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